Going Postal Again

Dave Paisley

It just so happens that the mail has been stacking up in the Strikethree.com mailroom for a few weeks now, so I decided it was time to empty out the old mailbag and give some faithful readers a shot at immortality.

First we have Joal, who wrote in after reading my stolen base article:

I just read your informative article concerning stolen bases and their actual contribution to runs scored...and thus wins.

While I agree (almost) whole-heartedly with your points, I do think such analyses of SB value always miss one key element: the effect of base stealers on the pitcher's concentration.

Why is this ignored? I'd venture to say that it's because it becomes quite hard to quantify. Regardless, though, with the advent of the slide step and the "12-throws-to-first" strategy I think it's fair to speculate that stolen base threats may improve the man-at-the-plate's production.

While I don't pretend to know the best method of testing this, one idea I have would be to check the OPS allowed of pitchers when, say, Rickey Henderson or Maury Wills was on base versus what it was without them on.

Your thoughts?

Well, you know I never have an opinion about these things. No, just kidding. While I don't have the stats for how other batters hit when Rickey Henderson is on first, with less than two out, after 6 p.m. on astroturf and less than a 4-knot wind, I do have the 1999 combined Major League stats in front of me. Combined, all pitchers in 1998 gave up a .266 batting average, a .335 on base percentage and a .420 slugging average. Keep those numbers in mind.

Leading off an inning (about 25% of plate appearances), they gave up .268/.329/.430, implying they were slightly less likely to give up a walk, and a bit more prone to getting hit for power.

With men in scoring position (again, about 25% of plate appearances), the numbers were .266/.352/.415, showing they were more likely to walk the batter, but marginally less likely to give up extra bases. Overall, there's not much of a change, certainly not enough to draw any major conclusions. It would be interesting to see how the numbers vary for individual pitchers, but I believe the system weeds out guys who can't pitch with men on -- they just don't stick around long.

For particularly disruptive base stealers, though, the effect can be significant. The heyday of Vince Coleman and Willie McGee in the mid-eighties is a case in point. I was at a game in St. Louis where they ran the Braves absolutely ragged. Those times are few and far between, though, and it takes an extraordinary talent to rise above the merely very good.

Next up is Brian, who had some thoughts about the whole Runs Created deal:

I like to multiply total bases times on base percentage for a quick and dirty method. Then I mentally note the fact that high percentage base stealers are cheated a few runs. RC divided into ABs plus BBs gives me RC per plate appearance. For MVP I like to add RUNS and RBIs and also factor in RC. RC is a theoretical measurement to rate a player independent of his teammates. RUNS and RBIs balance things by accounting for what has actually happened in the real world. Of lesser importance for MVP is defensive position, a good tie breaker. The least important tiebreaker is playing on a winning team.

Well, try telling that last one to the BBWAA. Seriously, though, you've hit on a reasonably easy to way to figure out an approximation for Runs Created. Not many people are into that kind of mental arithmetic gymnastics these days, though. The other nice point you make is to balance what is essentially a fictitious number with the real outcomes of the baseball world. Despite the fact that some people pooh-pooh RBIs as being too dependent on the players batting ahead of the player in question, it is still a useful piece of information. It just isn't as important as the BBWAA (and many others) think.

Finally, Tom writes about RC25, or Runs Created per 25 outs. Note that it never hurts to start out with a compliment:

Dave,

Let me first just say I really enjoy your group's web site.

I do have a comment about your most recent article. There's an inherent flaw I see to using RC/25 outs, or per any number of outs to evaluate hitters, which is that this method takes the players too far out of the team context. In a team context, player A who creates fewer runs per out by using more outs to create more runs than player B may still be the more valuable player than player B. The outs that player B doesn't make get reverted back to the "team pool" of outs, where they are distributed more or less evenly among the players on the team.

Thus a player who creates 120 runs using 250 outs (for 12 per 25 outs), might be less valuable than a player who creates 130 runs using 275 outs. The second player created 10 more runs than the first using 25 extra outs. This is below the average expected from either of these two players, but in all likelihood is better than what the rest of the team would have done with these outs.

While I appreciate the thoughts you express, let me go back to the "team pool of outs" idea. Remember that the most fixed and precious commodity an offense has in a game is outs. They may get 24 plate appearances, or they may get 45 or even 55 on a fabulous day, but in a nine-inning game, they're guaranteed to get only 24 to 27 outs. So, if I have Brian Hunter on my team and he leads off, he's going to suck up three or four of those outs every game. That's fewer outs for everyone else to play with.

However, rather than thinking of juggling outs between teammates, remember that the notion behind RC25 is that of just this one guy batting over and over. If you think of it that way, it's easy to see that a season of Rey Ordonez features a heck of a lot of 1-2-3 innings and not a lot of runs. On the other hand, a season of Mark McGwire or Ken Griffey Jr. is going to see a whole lot more offense than that. When you check out the numbers like that, it's easier to see how much more valuable the big guys are than the small fry.

Anyway, thanks for the input guys, and remember to keep that mailman busy.

about the author

Dave Paisley is currently working on the stat CB/27, which would compare the number of crappy beers an individual shirtless fat guy could drink during a game. Offer to provide numerical weighting for the amount of time spent attempting to get on TV between innings at drdjp@strikethree.com.