Fighting Tooth and Mail

Jason Michael Barker

Before I get started with this week's mailbag column, I'd like to apologize to all of you who have sent me e-mail to which I have not responded. Rest assured, I do read every piece of e-mail that arrives in my inbox, with the possible exception of the guy who keeps trying to sell me reconditioned printer cartridges or the nice lady who makes $5,000 a month working from home and wants me to get in on the action (er, no pun intended, though I do get that sort of spam too).

If you've sent me something in the past three months or so, all I can ask is that you be patient. I will get around to responding eventually, because I always hate reading those disclaimers that say, "While we cannot respond to every message personally, we do read each e-mail we receive..." Give me awhile, and I'll get back to you, honest.

A number of you wrote in last month with your thoughts on a certain topic; my thoughts on the subject can be found elsewhere on this very site. As I might have guessed, this particular article generated more e-mail than I've ever received on a single column. However, in the interest of timeliness (and because I think we're probably all sick of talking about the now-resolved labor situation), I'm going to pass on answering those e-mails in this space.

Moving on, our first letter comes from Thomas D., who writes:

More often than not I see managers move their corner players closer to the lines late in a game with a one run lead. I've always wondered why they don't do this for the entire game. I don't know, (maybe Bill James can figure it out), but one way or the other will make it harder to score a run. Why the hell don't they figure it out and go with it?

I think this one boils down to conventional wisdom, but unlike most pieces of baseball conventional wisdom this is not shared by all managers. Some managers like to play the lines late in a close game, while others eschew the practice in favor of the traditional defensive alignment. For those who like to guard the lines, the idea is that they want to protect against a double down the line, even at the expense of giving up an extra single or two in the hole.

My guess is that over the course of many seasons, it doesn't make a particle of difference one way or the other. As for Bill James figuring it out, the problem there is that the information isn't available from past games to do the figuring. If someone wanted to start recording this from now on, we might have something to work with in a few years. But much like the old adage about the drawn-in infield boosting a batter's average 100 points, we'll probably never know the answer for sure.

Next up is Tom M.:

As a non-insider fan, I try not to waste time speculating about subjective possibilities. However, as soon as I read that Jeff Weaver passed through Oakland to the Yankees I wondered whether the temper tantrums of Weaver made him a non-fit in Oakland as well as in Detroit. My recollection is that the Tigers players took time to call their agents on their cell phones before they pulled Mike Sweeney off Weaver a couple of years ago. Since that episode I figured, in the 30 seconds that I speculated on the matter, that Weaver would either calm down or be moved from the Tigers. Do you have any cosmic thoughts on the role of personality fits in Major League Clubhouses?

The Jeff Weaver trade? See, I'm embarrassed at how long it has been since I answered e-mail. As for the trade itself, I've got a couple of thoughts. First, the A's probably viewed Ted Lilly (plus prospects John-Ford Griffin and Jay Arnold) as a better package than Weaver, but not because of his attitude in the clubhouse. Lilly is every bit as good as Weaver, all without the history of being worked hard. Throw in two prospects plus the fact that Weaver makes about $2M more than Lilly, and I'd rather have the Lilly-plus-two package as well.

As for clubhouse chemistry, I'm generally of the opinion that it's overrated; bad teams are often accused of having poor chemistry, but you almost never hear about good teams having that problem. In one sense, winning breeds good chemistry. As far as Weaver goes, though, you might be on to something. After the trade, Weaver called Luis Pujols a bad manager. Asked recently if he regretted saying it, he said, "No, because it's true." We don't know what was going on prior to the trade, but it's certainly possible Weaver tried to undermine Pujols' authority in the clubhouse.

Next up is John D., who writes in with something people never tire of reminding me about:

I hope you've since done something to make up for this ridiculous comment: "Alfonso Soriano is a fraud. Sure, he's hitting .282 and the Yankees like the "pop in his bat." Sunday was a big day for the young infielder -- he drew a walk, giving him a grand total of ONE in 112 at-bats this season. In case you're wondering, that brings his career total to TWO in 161 at-bats. Soriano entered Sunday with a higher batting average (.277) than on-base percentage (.275), a feat only a true out-maker could hope to accomplish. Throw in a marginal glove and you're looking at a very bad player." He's still not grabbing many walks... but with his numbers, who cares?

Every couple of months, I get an email from someone asking about either Alfonso Soriano or Shea Hillenbrand. Last season, as the pair put up marginal numbers (or horrible numbers, in the case of Hillenbrand), I was quite critical of them and their teams for giving them regular at-bats. Hillenbrand has rebounded somewhat to put up solid numbers, though it's worth noting that after his early-season love affair with plate discipline, he has returned to his hacking ways.

Soriano, on the other hand, still won't take a walk but has put up amazing numbers this season regardless. He has actually walked less this season than he did last season, both in terms of his raw walk total and walk rate, but has more than made up for it by hitting 40 points higher as well as increasing his power production tremendously.

At the risk of sounding like sour grapes, I'm still not convinced he can keep it up. Very few players with plate discipline this bad last very long in the majors; even early his career, Sammy Sosa displayed a far superior strikeout-to-walk ratio. Ditto Vladimir Guerrero, who has never been a big-time strikeout hitter. I'm not saying Soriano won't adjust, but at some point pitchers will simply stop throwing him anything in the strike zone. Doing so, particularly early in the count, just doesn't make sense given his approach at the plate.

Finally, this more recent e-mail from Jeff D.:

The Reds had a high-A affiliate in 2002, the Stockton Ports in the California League. They even won the league championship, for what it's worth. Wily MoPena skipped a league to try and get him ready for his 2003 callup, not because the Reds don't have a high-A team.

My bad Jeff. I guess I'm still stuck in the past, when the Reds really didn't have a high-A team; I wasn't aware they had fixed the problem. Given that Pena has to stick in the majors next season, jumping him to AA seems like a smart move to get him ready for 2003. And my congratulations go out to the Ports, who knocked off the Lake Elsinore Storm (a San Diego affiliate) three games to one to win the California League championship this season.

about the author

Jason Michael Barker has tried to get everyone he knows to send him good old snail mail rather than the electronic variety, but so far it's not working. Suggest he send SASEs instead of IOUs when you write jmb@strikethree.com.

Web Strikethree.com