Outfield Showdown II

Dave Paisley

In Part II of my review of today's big name elite slugging outfielders, I'll be taking a look at how well they do in critical situations. As always, the measure of greatness will primarily be OPS (On base percentage Plus Slugging average.) The elite outfielders in question are Ken Griffey Jr., Juan Gonzalez, Barry Bonds and Sammy Sosa. These are the guys with the MVP trophies clogging up the mantle. As before, my apologies to Manny Ramirez, Gary Sheffield and Albert Belle for omitting them, but life is full of choices, and they aren't mine. Certainly not the latter two.

Anyway, if you check out the previous article, you will discover how these guys each handle different ball-strike situations. This article focuses on how they do in particular game situations. This first chart shows how they do relative to a league average hitter overall, and in three particular game situations: with men in scoring position, late in a close game (using the STATS, Inc. definition - check out Clutching First Base for a detailed description), and leading off an inning. This data is all collected from the last five seasons, meaning that there's as reasonable chance that there will ever be of having a reasonable sample size of plate appearances in these situations.

First off, Bonds is well ahead of the pack in terms of overall performance, followed by Griffey, then Gonzalez, with Sosa bringing up the rear. With men in scoring position, Griffey shines a little more, catching up to Bonds, while Sosa catches up to Gonzalez. Close and late shows the same pattern. Gonzalez is the only one of the four whose performance close and late is worse than his overall performance. Interesting, considering he's supposed to be Mr. Clutch RBI Man. Leading off an inning, none on/out, the reverse holds true. Now Gonzo shines, while the other guys appear not to care too much for the task. Once again, this is an interesting contrast to the way most people perceive these players.

Next, let's take a look at that same data, but compared to the player's own average performance, and let's also throw in the MLB average player. This mythical average player is derived from all of the 1999 season data.

The chart shows quite clearly that the league-average player does marginally better than normal with men in scoring position. This is probably due at least as much to pitcher and defense distraction as to batter fortitude. It's also clear that Griffey and Sosa crank up their game a notch in that situation, while Bonds is right around league average and Gonzalez doesn't change at all.

Close and late, the average player tanks a little. Maybe he chokes up a little. Whatever the reason, his performance is off 5%. Juan Gonzalez shows up as twice the choker, while Griffey, Bonds and Sosa do a smidgen better than our average player. Finally, with none out or on, our average player shines a little, and it's very evident that Gonzalez likes the situation but Bonds couldn't care less. Griffey, and to a lesser extent, Sosa, lose interest too.

So how can we explain all of those Gonzalez RBIs and that reputation as a fearsome clutch hitter? Maybe the next chart has some clues...

And there it is... This chart shows the percentage of plate appearances that each player has had in these situations over the last five years. Gonzalez has had 4% more plate appearances with runners in scoring position than Bonds, Griffey and Sosa. That's actually a 14% increase in situational plate appearances relative to those other guys (+4%/28% = 14%). Given that the vast majority of RBIs come with men in scoring position (in 1999, 74% of MLB RBIs came from the 27% of plate appearances with men in scoring position) it's no shock that Gonzo gets a lot more RBIs. In his case we can credit the likes of Mark McLemore, Rusty Greer, and heaven forbid, perhaps even Tom Goodwin for getting on base ahead of Juan the last five years.

It's interesting that both Gonzo and Griffey have had noticeably fewer close-and-late opportunities, but this could be due to the fact that their teams play in more slugfests, resulting in fewer overall close and late games. As for leading off innings - if we factored out leadoff guys from the league average numbers, I'm sure our sluggers would be right around normal compared to the rest. I'm not sure I have a good theory why Gonzo tends to lead off innings more, especially given that the guys ahead of him tended to get on base more than average over this period of time.

The final two charts show our heroes' strikeout and walk ratios:

There doesn't seem to be much variation in strikeouts at all here. Bonds strikes out least, Sosa much more, with Griffey and Gonzalez close to league average. As for walks...

... just look at how opposing managers and pitchers avoid Bonds in critical situations. Griffey too, to a degree, but Gonzo and Sammy don't seem to get much special treatment. If we look at the none on/out situation, we can see that Gonzo isn't one to sit around waiting for ball four, no sir. So let's just never suggest that he lead off for a team, hmmm?Well, that concludes my exhaustive analysis of our outfield stars. Next week I'll be getting around to season predictions, so stay tuned. Meanwhile, it's off to Phoenix to take in a little spring training.

about the author

Dave Paisley finally hit pay dirt, having been on a waiting list since 1991 to distribute his "Twin Tones" unofficial team magazine outside the Metrodome. Let him down gently at drdjp@strikethree.com.